Abstract-In this paper, we consider a two-way relay network where two sources can communicate only through an unauthenticated intermediate relay node. We investigate secure communications of this two-way relay scenario using physical layer security. Specifically, we treat the relay node as an eavesdropper from whom the information transmitted by the sources needs to be kept secret, despite the fact that its cooperation in relaying this information is essential. We first find that a non-zero secrecy rate is indeed achievable in this two-way relay network even without external jammers. Further still, with the help of friendly jammers who can transmit jamming signals to distract the malicious relay, a positive gain of the secrecy rate can be realized. In order to obtain the maximum secrecy rate, we define and then analyze an optimization problem. Finally, an optimal solution of jamming power allocation is provided for the system with friendly jammers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, security in wireless networks has been mainly considered at higher layers using cryptographic methods. However, recent advances in wireless decentralized and adhoc networking have led to an increasing attention on studying physical layer based security. The basic idea of physical layer security is to exploit the physical characteristics of the wireless channel to provide secure communications. The security is quantified by the secrecy capacity, which is defined as the maximum rate of reliable information sent from the source to the intended destination in the presence of eavesdroppers. This line of work was pioneered by Aaron Wyner, who introduced the wiretap channel and established fundamental results of creating perfectly secure communications without relying on private keys [1] . Wyner showed that when the eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the main channel, the source and the destination can exchange perfectly secure messages at a non-zero rate. Follow-up work in [2] the secrecy capacity of Gaussian wiretap channel was studied, and in [3] Wyner's approach was extended to the transmission of confidential messages over broadcast channels.
Note the fact that if the source-wiretapper channel is less noisy than the source-destination channel, the perfect secrecy capacity will be zero [3] . Cooperative jamming is considered as a promising approach to improve the secrecy capacity by distracting the eavesdropper with codewords independent of the source messages. In [4] , [5] , several cooperative jamming schemes were investigated for different scenarios. In [6] , the author studied the classical one-way relay channel with confidential messages, where the relay node acts as both an eavesdropper and a helper. Then in [7] , the authors investigated a two-hop communication system using an untrusted relay and showed that a cooperative jammer enables a positive secrecy capacity which would be otherwise impossible. In [8] , [9] , the authors employed game theory to physical layer security to study the interaction between the source and the friendly jammers who assist the source by distracting the eavesdropper and got some distributed game solutions.
In this paper, we investigate physical layer security issues in a two-way relay network with friendly jammers. The two source nodes could exchange information only through an unauthenticated relay node, as there is no direct communication link between them. The unauthenticated relay node employing amplify-and-forward (AF) protocol, acts as both an essential relay and a malicious eavesdropper who also wants to eavesdrop the data information transmitted by the sources. For convenience and ease of comparison, we first study the system without jammers as a special case. We find that a non-zero secrecy rate here is indeed available even without the help of jammers interfering the malicious relay. We also derive an optimal power vector of the relay and the sources by maximizing the secrecy rate. Then, we investigate the two-way relay secure communications with friendly jammers, and we find that a positive gain can be obtained in the secrecy rate. We further derive an optimal jamming power allocation of the friendly jammers through an optimization problem. In the optimization problem that we formulate here, the sources have to pay the friendly jammers for interfering the malicious relay, in order to increase the secrecy rate. The friendly jammers charge the sources with a certain price for their service of jamming. Finally, the proposed schemes are verified by simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model of two-way relay communication with friendly jammers is described and the corresponding secrecy rate is formulated. In Section III, a two-way relay system without jammers as a special case is investigated. In Section IV, we formulate and then analyze a source optimization problem of physical layer security with friendly jammers. Simulation results are provided in Section V and the conclusions are drawn in Section VI. System model for two-way relay communications with friendly jammers node, and N friendly jammer nodes, which are denoted by S k , k = 1, 2, R, and J i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, respectively. We denote by N the set of indices {1, 2, . . . , N}. All the nodes here are equipped with only a single omni-directional antenna and operate in a half-duplex way, i.e., each node cannot receive and transmit simultaneously. Then the complete transmission can be divided into two phases. During the first phase, shown with solid lines, both source nodes transmit their information to the relay node. Simultaneously, the friendly jammers also transmit the jamming signals in order to distract the malicious relay. In the second phase, shown with dashed lines, the relay node broadcasts a combined version of the received signals to both source nodes. Note that this two phases' transmission will lead to a loss in spectral efficiency due to the pre-log factor 1/2 in corresponding expressions for the achievable capacity. A key assumption we make here is that the sources have perfect knowledge of the jamming signals transmitted by the friendly jammers, for they have paid for the service. In addition, global channel state information (CSI) is also available in our assumptions.
Let s 1 ∈ A, s 2 ∈ A, and s J i ∈ A, i ∈ N, denote the signal to be transmitted by the source S 1 , S 2 , and the jammer J i , i ∈ N, respectively, where A represents a unity power constellation set. Suppose source nodes S 1 and S 2 transmit with power p 1 and p 2 , and the channel gains from the source nodes to the relay node are denoted by h S k ,R , k = 1, 2. Each friendly jammer node i transmits with power p J i , and the channel gain from it to the relay node is denoted by h Ji,R , i ∈ N . The channel gain contains the path loss and the Rayleigh fading coefficient with zero mean and unit variance. For simplicity, we assume that the fading coefficients are constant over one frame, and vary independently from one frame to another.
In phase 1, the received signal at the malicious relay can be expressed as
where n r denotes the thermal noise at the relay node R, which is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with two sided power spectral density of σ 2 . Furthermore, we assume that S 1 , S 2 , and R have the same noise variance.
In phase 2, the malicious relay, which works in AF mode, amplifies the received signal y r by a factor β and then broadcasts the signal to both S 1 and S 2 with power p r . The power normalization factor β at the relay node can be written as
Then the corresponding signal received by the source S 1 , denoted by y 1 , can be written as
where
Similarly, the signal received by the source S 2 , denoted by y 2 , can be written as
Assuming that both the source nodes and the jammer nodes are independent, from (1), in phase 1, using the matched filter (MF) 1 , the unauthenticated relay node has the capacity with respect to S 1 and S 2 as
and
where W represents the channel bandwidth, g S1,R |h S1,R | 2 ,
In phase 2, at S 1 , as s 1 as well as s J i is known to the source node, and thus we have
Then the corresponding SNR for the transmission from S 2 to S 1 , denoted by γ 2 , can be expressed as
. Similarly, at S 2 , the received signal with s 2 and s J i removed can be written as
Then the corresponding SNR for the transmission from S 1 to S 2 , denoted by γ 1 , can be expressed as
. Capacities of two-way relay channel between the two sources are denoted by C 1 and C 2 , and we have
The secrecy rate for S 1 and S 2 [2] can be defined as
where (x) + represents max {x, 0}.
III. SECRECY RATE OF TWO-WAY RELAY CHANNEL WITHOUT JAMMERS
For comparison and consistence, we first investigate the special case without the presence of jammers in this section. We prove that there indeed exists a positive secrecy rate for the two-way relay channel even without the help of friendly jammers distracting the malicious relay. Furthermore, we also obtain an optimal power allocation of the sources and the relay to maximize the secrecy rate. In the next section, we will compare the case with friendly jammers with this case to expect a positive performance gain in the secrecy rate.
As a special case, if the jammers are not used, the jammers' transmit power p J i should be set to zero, ∀i ∈ N . Then from the derivation above, we can get the corresponding secrecy rate in this case as
A. Existence of Non-zero Secrecy Rate
When the eavesdropper channels from the two sources to the malicious relay are degraded versions of the equivalent main two-way relay channel between S 1 and S 2 , the two sources can exchange perfectly secure messages at a non-zero rate. Firstly, we consider the transmission from S 1 to S 2 . In phase 1, the malicious relay receives the signal s 1 from S 1 , which consists of the information for S 2 . Meanwhile, S 2 also transmits the signal s 2 to the relay, which acts as both the information carrier for S 1 and a jamming signal that makes the eavesdropper channel from S 1 to the malicious relay getting worse. In phase 2, the combined signal consisting of s 1 and s 2 arrives at S 2 . As S 2 has a perfect knowledge of its own signal s 2 , the signal that jammed the malicious relay in phase 1 has no such an effect on S 2 . Therefore, it makes possible that the eavesdropper channel is worse than the data transmission channel from S 1 to S 2 , which means that a non-zero rate for secure communication from S 1 to S 2 is available. It is the same situation in the transmission from S 2 to S 1 . From (15), (16) and the expressions of K 1 in (10) and K 2 in (8), we can write the probability of the existence of a non-zero secrecy rate as
where 2 ), which actually indicates that a non-zero secrecy rate in the two-way relay channel is indeed available.
B. Maximizing the Secrecy Rate
In this subsection, we try to get an optimal power vector of (p r , p 1 , p 2 ) which maximizes the secrecy rate of the two-way relay channel. We can formulate the problem subject to the individual secrecy rate constraints and power constraints as
From (17), we havẽ
From (15), (16), and (18), we can get 
It can be calculated that ∂F (pr,p1,p2) ∂pr > 0 is always established under the conditions of (22), which implies that F (p r , p 1 , p 2 ) is a monotonically increasing function of p r . Therefore, when maximizing the secrecy rateC s , the relay should always transmit with the maximum power p max , i.e., p r opt = p max , where p r opt denotes the optimal relay power. As a result, the problem can be further transformed into maxF (p max , p 1 , p 2 ).
From (21), we can observe that how high the value of F (p max , p 1 , p 2 ) could reach is determined by the gap between K 1 and p 2 g S2,R , as well as K 2 and p 1 g S1,R . And thus, we can obtain that when maximizing the secrecy rateC s , at least one of the sources should transmit with p max , and the one which is chosen to transmit with this maximum power is determined by the channel gains g S1,R and g S1,R . Hence, the optimal power allocation strategies of S 1 and S 2 can be given as follows: 
IV. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY WITH FRIENDLY JAMMERS
In this section, we investigate the physical layer security for two-way relay communication with friendly jammers. First, we find that the secrecy rate of data transmission can be improved using friendly jammers. These jammers introduce extra interference to the malicious relay while the interference is known to the sources. Then, we formulate a source optimization problem and analyze the corresponding utility function of the two sources to get an optimal solution of jamming power allocation.
A. Secrecy Rate Improved using Friendly Jammers
From (13) and (14), we have
From (23) and (24), we can see that both C k and C (15) and (16), we can get that if
pr < min {g S1,R , g S2,R }, the gain of the secrecy rate will be above zero in some region of the jamming power p J i . Therefore, we have that the secrecy rate could be improved with the help of friendly jammers. To maximize the improvement, we investigate a source optimization problem next.
B. Source Optimization Analysis
We consider the two sources as two buyers who want to optimize their secrecy rate, while the cost paid for the "service", i.e., jamming power p J i , should also be taken into consideration. For the sources' side we can define the utility function as
where a is a positive constant representing the gain per unit rate, and M is the cost to pay for the friendly jammers. Here we have
where m i is the price per unit power paid for the friendly jammer i by the sources, i ∈ N . It can be calculated that ∂Us ∂pr > 0 always holds when p r ∈ (0, p max ], i.e., when optimizing the utility, the relay should always transmit with the maximum power p max . As all the nodes transmit with independent power, we can treat the jamming power p J i as a constant when considering the optimal power vector of (p 1 , p 2 ). Therefore we can get the same results of the optimal vector as given in the previous section. Hence, our major purpose here is to study how to control the jamming power so as to achieve the maximum utility value.
Then the source optimization problem can be expressed as
The goal of the sources as buyers is to buy the optimal amount of power from the friendly jammers in order to maximize the secrecy rate. From (23), (24), and (27), we have
where A 1
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To investigate the performances, we conduct the following simulations. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we consider a simple two-way relay system with only one friendly jammer, where the sources S 1 , S 2 , and the malicious relay R are located at the coordinate (−1, 0), (1, 0) , and (0, 0), respectively. Here we study two different jammer locations which are (0.3, 0.4) and (0.6, 0.8). The other simulation parameters are set up as follows: The maximum power constraint p max is 10; the transmission bandwidth is 1; the noise variance is σ 2 = 0.01; Rayleigh fading channel is assumed, where the channel gain consists of the path loss and the Rayleigh fading coefficient; the path loss factor is 2. Here we select a = 1 for the source optimization utility in (27) .
For the special case without jammers, we set the jamming power up to zero. In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , we show the secrecy rate as a function of the two sources' transmitting power p 1 and p 2 in this special case. It shows that the optimal power vector of (p 1 , p 2 ) is (0.22p max , p max ) when g S1,R = 0.3857 and g S2,R = 0.0443, and (p max , 0.32p max ) when g S1,R = 0.0508 and g S2,R = 0.3018. After further calculation, we can see that the results agree with the optimal power allocation conclusions given in Section III well.
In Fig. 4 , we show the secrecy rate as a function of the jamming power when p 1 , p 2 , and p r are all set up to p max . We can see that with the increase of the jamming power, the secrecy rate first increases and then decreases. There indeed exists an optimal point of the jamming power the sources need. Also the optimal point depends on the location of the friendly jammer, and we can find that the friendly jammer close to the malicious relay is more effective to improve the secrecy 978-1-4244-5638-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE In Fig. 5 , we show the optimal amount of jamming power bought by the sources as a function of the price asked by the friendly jammer. We can see that the amount of bought power gets reduced if the price goes high and the sources would even stop buying after some price point. Thus, there is a tradeoff for the jammers to set the price. If the price is set too high, the sources would buy less power or even stop buying. But if the price is set too low, the jammers would benefit very little. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the physical layer security for two-way relay communication with friendly jammers. As a special case, a two-way relay system without jammers was studied first, where we found that a positive secrecy rate is indeed available. In addition, we derived an optimal power allocation vector of the source and relay nodes. Then we investigated the secrecy rate in the presence of friendly jammers. We defined a source optimization problem and obtained an optimal solution of jamming power allocation. From the simulation results, we can see that a non-zero secrecy rate of two-way relay channel is achievable, and it can be improved with the help of friendly jammers who transmit jamming signals to confuse the malicious relay. There is also a tradeoff for the price a jammer asks, and if the price is too high, the sources would not buy or buy from others. It is worthwhile mentioning that, due to space limitation, we mainly investigated the sources' side optimization problem. But there exists a game between the sources and the friendly jammers, and this will be studied in our future work.
